1. Field of the Invention
The current invention relates to Homeland Security, and, more specifically, to expediting release procedure of cargo containers at border crossing or at customs entry point by tracking and reporting threats while cargo containers are in transit.
2. Discussion of the Prior Art
Here are some facts that were disclosed in the written testimony before a hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, at the United States House of Representatives, during discussions on “The Limitations of the Current Cargo Container Targeting”, on “A Review to Assess Progress with the Bureau of Customs and Border”, and on “Protection's Targeting Program for Sea Cargo” by Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.), Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, on Mar. 31, 2004.
The USA is spending more on conventional military power than the next thirty nations combined. By 2008, the USA will be spending more than the rest of the world combined. America's military supremacy means that the only way the current and future adversaries can attack the U.S. is to use an asymmetrical approach, like the 9/11 attack on American soil. This is because such asymmetrical attacks could generate a widespread economic and societal disruption which weakens the foundation upon America's military supremacy ultimately rests.
There are many possible scenarios of how the United States could be targeted by terrorist groups. The intermodal transportation system that is the backbone of the global supply chains that support the U.S. manufacturing and retailing sectors could be a primary target. The current intermodal transportation system makes it possible to move up to 65,000 pounds of goods in one box from anywhere on the planet to the United States for a few thousand dollars. It has proven to be a boon for organized crime. Based on arrest and seizure records, it is known that criminals have been smuggling human beings, small-arms, multi-ton cargo shipments of narcotics, knock-off products, and every other form of contraband in containers. For example, cargo thieves stole an estimated $15 billion of goods in 2000—up from about $1 billion of cargo theft a decade before.
The same system that has proven to be so vulnerable to criminal activity, is clearly susceptible to being targeted by terrorists. For example, according to the Jerusalem Post, the Palestinian terrorists responsible for the suicide bombings at the Port of Ashdod which killed ten Israelis may have been smuggled from Gaza in a container outfitted with a secret compartment and an arms cache. If this turns out to be the case, the risk that containers can be used as a weapons delivery device is no longer a hypothetical threat.
However, the terrorist risk associated with containers goes beyond their being a conduit for suicide bombers. A much more disturbing possibility is that a container could be used to transmit a weapon of mass destruction. There is no doubt that should a nuclear weapon be smuggled into the United States and activated, it would have devastating consequences in terms of loss of life and destruction of property within the blast zone. But unlike a weapon delivered by a missile, an attack carried out with a container would likely lead to the shutdown of all U.S. ports. Should the U.S. ports be locked down for a period of three weeks—which is not inconceivable should a terrorist group like al Qaeda carry out a simultaneous attack using containers arriving in different ports—the entire global trade system would go into gridlock. Since the transportation system has become the warehouses for just-in-time retailers and manufactures, the U.S. store shelves would quickly go bare and the U.S. factories would be idled.
If the current transportation system is not significantly improved, the probability of detection of a weapon from an untrusted shipper being 9.75 percent rises to only a maximum of 24 percent if the cargo shipment comes from a certified shipper. However, if the weapon is placed in a 20-foot container which are commonly used to move heavy machinery, the probability of detection drops to nearly zero because the radiography cannot penetrate cargo that would likely be between the wall of the container and the weapon.